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Rise and of Welfare Consensus 
 
For the most part of the Twentieth century England has experienced a progressive increase in 
the role of the State, embodied in welfare measures and a massive intervention in the economy. 
The growth of the welfare state began in 1909 with Lloyd George, and the first half of the 
century was strongly influenced by the ideas of the Fabian Society, the Bloomsbury Group and 
John Maynard Keynes. This process saw the parallel growth of the Labour Party, driven by a 
socialist ideology and closely aligned with the Trade Union movement, although the 
Conservative Party was by no means immune from the socialist “virus” that had “infected” the 
whole British political body. Both the great crisis of 1929 and World War II played a very 
significant role in the progressive widening of the scope of State action. World War II, in 
particular, strengthened the process in two respects: under the guise of military necessity, it 
greatly increased the power in the hands of the government; on the other hand , it fostered the 
expectation of the public that after the war, their sacrifices were bound to be rewarded by a 
profusion of social benefits. 
The Cabinet of Clement R. Attlee (1945-51) begot the so-called “Welfare Labour”, which 
was broadly outlined in the “Beveridge Report” (1942). 1945 saw the onset of the “welfare 
consensus”, a long period characterized by a broad agreement on high public spending and 
state interventionism. Both Labour and Conservative governments supported those wage 
increases that following the Keynesian orthodoxy, were bound to stimulate the aggregate 
demand and, therefore, to reduce unemployment. The welfare consensus was not an organic set 
of ideas, nor a set of explicit agreements between two parties. Recent literature claims, not 
unreasonably, that the conventional picture of the consensus is probably an exaggerated one, 
since important differences remained between the two parties. The consensus, however, was 
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undoubtedly a milestone in the history of the British polity. Is most salient feature can be 
identified in the establishment of a “middle ground” based on the intervention of the state in 
the economy, and specifically in the attempt to ensure the full employment of the male 
population and improvement of housing conditions. 
Until the second Churchill government (1951-55), the rhetoric of individualism and liberal 
spirit remained in the Conservative Party, at least at a “peripheral” level. However, after the 
withdrawal of the old leader these elements almost disappeared completely. The consensus was 
finally solidified during Harold Macmillan’s government (1957-63). In 1938, in a book entitled 
Middle Way, he advocated a mixed economy based on a corporatist economic concept. At its 
core was the belief in the inevitable decline of capitalism. Looking at this book, is perhaps 
possible to see part of British liberalism as an attempt, theoretical (Mill), economic (Keynes) 
and political (Macmillan), to attain a kind of “socialism” from liberal positions, or rather 
reconcile the two positions as complementary. Everything seasoned with “British pride”, 
namely the belief that the British political class was able to succeed where others had failed. In 
this sense, despite the long period in which the Conservatives were in power (1951-64), the 
political debate “shifted to the left”, and it was often the Conservatives who were increasing the 
social spending and nationalizing of some companies.  
The consensus began to break up in the late Sixties, when the unsustainable burden of debt 
and the problems of the static economy emerged in all their drama. Then, Britain appeared as 
the “great ill” of Europe and many commentators spoke of a so-called “British disease”. 
Throughout the Sventies the consensus gradually declined, and the government was unable to 
face the conflict with the Trade Unions, which inevitably followed every attempt to reform the 
system. The situation is well represented by the Conservative government of Edward Heath 
(1970-74), who won the elections proposing a program with liberal inspiration, and tried to 
achieve this goal in his first two years. In particular, in 1972 he passed the Industrial Relations Act, 
in order to reduce the power of Trade Unions. However, because of their opposition, and 
combined with the aggravated economic situation resulting from the oil crisis, Heath made the 
so-called U-Turn. This is a symbolic episode of how the government was no longer able to 
make choices and implement reforms. The memory of Heath’s government will be crucial in 
setting the strategy of Margaret Thatcher. 
The two Labour governments which followed could only state that the hitherto adopted 
Keynesian policies were undefendable, and showed themselves hostages of the Trade Unions’ 
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power. Harold Wilson was replaced in March 1976 by James Callaghan, who represented the 
dramatic figure of a politician aware of the need to replace Keynesian policies without a clash 
with Trade Unions, which strongly influenced the Labour Party, and were also linked with the 
control of financial resources. In Blackpool in 1976, he gave a well-known speech in which he 
de facto took note of the impossibility of the full employment of the male population, which was 
the cornerstone of post-war welfare politics.1  
Callaghan’s strategy was confronted with a big wave of strikes by public workers, which 
passed into history as the “Winter of discontent” (1978-79). The Trade Unions finally got salary 
increases of 20%, which proved once again, their status as the real “decision makers” in British 
politics. This was a dramatic moment in the history of British democracy, as also demonstrated 
in large part by the Anglo-Saxon literature, which in those years produced a large amount of 
writing about the crisis of democracy.2  
 
 
The new Torism.  
 
When Margaret Thatcher was still leader of the opposition party (1975-79), some columnists3 and 
some members of the Conservative Party4 started to speak about a “revolution”. The elements 
that bring about such a change are the outcome of a complex interplay of theoretical analysis 
and historical circumstances – if not happenstance – which found an indispensable nexus in 
Thatcher’s personality and leadership style.  
A starting point for understanding Thatcherism is an investigation of its impact on the 
internal politics of the Conservative Party, which was bound to be deeply changed by her 
leadership. As previously mentioned, a mindset that basically married the old Tory paternalism 
with the welfare and Keynesian economics was dominant throughout the Fifties and the Sixties. 
The one dissident of consequence was Enoch Powell. He had an excellent command of liberal 
                                                          
1 The speech was mainly written by Peter Jay, the popular economics commentator for The Times, which had long opposed 
the several Keynesian theories and in the following years was to be close to Thatcher’s policies. The speech is partially 
published and commented in James CALLAGHAN, Time and Chance, Politicos Publishing, London 2006 (1987), pp. 425 e ss.  
2 For a review see A. H. BIRCH, Overload, Ungovernability and Delegitimation: The Theories and the British Case, «British Journal of 
Political Science», n.14, 1984. 
3 See in particular the prominent historian of the conservative tradition, Lord Blake, who wrote «the Conservative Party is 
going trough a period of major rethinking for the first time since 1945-50», in BLAKE, R., PATTEN, J. (eds) The conservative 
Opportunity, Macmillan, London, 1976, p.1.  
4 See GILMOUR, Ian, Inside Right, A study of conservatism, Hutckinson, London 1977. 
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ideas, as evidenced by a number of his writings5, which occasionally amount to a de facto 
paraphrasing of thinkers such as Ludwig von Mises or Friedrich Hayek. In 1958, Powell 
resigned from the Cabinet of Harold Macmillan6, but continues to remain a sort of critical 
conscience, of the party, albeit often unheeded. He was source of inspiration both for Thatcher 
and Keith Joseph. 
Keith Joseph is a pivotal figure. He was among the champions of liberal policies early in 
Heath’s government, although it must be conceded that in those years neither Joseph nor 
Margaret Thatcher, both ministers in the Heath’s Cabinet, distinguished themselves by fighting 
against the excessive spending of their offices. After the U-Turn, Joseph began to disseminate 
liberal ideas, both within the party and in several remarkable speeches.7 He was instrumental (as 
evidenced by some recent bibliographies8) in changing the Conservative Party and was widely 
considered a de facto candidate for the leadership of the party against Edward Heath. 
Joseph withdrew his candidacy as a result of the onslaught in the press after his gaffe 
regarding the intelligence of the poorest people.9 He then committed himself to supporting 
Thatcher’s candidacy, helping to bolster her position within the party and developing the 
distinctive policies of her government. In many respects, Joseph can be considered Thatcher’s 
alter ego. He was a reserved, if not shy, politician; as brilliant of an opinion maker as he was unfit 
for confrontation and political clashes. His withdrawal from the race for leadership in favour of 
Thatcher was one of those fortuitous, but providential (for free market ideas) events that 
occasionally occur in history. 
After the withdrawal of Keith Joseph, Thatcher used his legacy and his ideas to challenge 
Heath’s leadership. Heath had been the leader of the party since 1964 and despite his strong 
control over it, a replacement seemed inevitable. The way in which Thatcher claimed power 
was a very good mix of audacity, ability and fortune, a mix that characterised many moments of 
her political career. The fact that few wanted Heath as a leader, yet nobody dared to challenge 
                                                          
5 See Enoch POWELL, A Nation Not Afraid. The Thinking of Enoch Powell, Badsford, London 1965 and Freedom and Reality (ed. 
J. Wood), Batsford, London 1969. 
6 The resignation from the Cabinet by all the Treasury ministers (Enoch Powell, Peter Thorneycroft and Nigel Birch) in 
1958, for their disapproval of the excessive governmental expenditures, was considered by the premier Macmillan as “small 
local problems”. It was probably one of the blackest moments for liberal ideas. The episode was to provide Mrs. Thatcher’s 
rhetoric with some convenient “martyrs”. 
7 The most momentous, given in Upminster on June 1974, would be read in A. SHERMAN Paradox of Power: Reflections on the 
Thatcher Interlude, Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2005. 
8 See in particular A. DENHAM e M. GARNETT , Keith Joseph, Acumen Publishing Ltd, 2002.  
9 Joseph had argued that most single mothers, because of their economic and social conditions, could not provide a proper 
education to their children, and went as far as to see in this a decline of the “British race”.  
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him, allowed Thatcher to capitalise on the consensus, or at least acquiescence, of the party to 
her political proposal of a minority and an outsider candidate. 
Once she was elected, however, the problems did not disappear. Her opponents were the 
Heath loyalists in the party ranks and the supporters of the old Tory paternalism (whom she 
used to call “wets”, as opposed to her “dry” supporters) who had no sympathy for her ideas. 
Even being an outsider represented a liability, in two important respects. First, she was a 
woman in a still largely male-dominated party, and second, she was the daughter of a grocer, 
not a member of the upper class, as was the case for much of the Conservative leadership. 
From the beginning, therefore, she caused a rift within the party. 
In that moment, however, the need for a renewal was strongly felt, and this played in her 
favour. Thatcher could count on a few confidants, such as Keith Joseph and Goffrey Howe, 
but she immediately showed great skill in enlisting the support of the backbenchers, namely, 
the members of parliament lacking prestige assignments. They often saw her as a representative 
of the middle class, as opposed to the leadership of the party that they felt was becoming 
increasingly distant. In time, Ms. Thatcher showed to be capable of managing the side of the 
party (as well as civil servants, who sometimes were even more important then ministers in 
setting policy guidelines) that was hostile to her general governing philosophy. Aware that her 
position was shaky, she appointed members of the wing of the party that opposed her to 
important positions, initially in her shadow cabinet, and later in the Cabinet proper. As time 
passed, she gradually limited their autonomy and their power, until she was able to sack them or 
convince them to resign. 
The main feature of her leadership, not the least of which pertained to the internal affairs of 
the Party, was undoubtedly her tenacity. She conceded when necessary, only to slowly but 
surely retake the lost ground, appointing to influential positions a circle of trusted individuals. 
When selecting individuals to be appointed to strategic assignments, the sharing of her basic 
philosophy was paramount. The crucial question was always the same: “is he one of us?”10 does 
he share our values? 
A series of favourable circumstances, both in the party and in the country at large, had a 
determining role in her endeavour to achieve the leadership of her party and the premiership. 
In either case, if her grasp on her position was uncertain, she managed to hold on thanks to her 
ability to use those circumstances to her advantage. An emblematic case was the Falklands war. 
                                                          
10 This question give the title at one of the most relevant Thatcher’s intellectual biography: Hugo YOUNG, One of Us: Life of 
Margaret Thatcher, Macmillan, London 1989. 
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The popularity she achieved thanks to the victorious short conflict enormously contributed to 
the Conservative victory in the 1983 election, which appeared almost unthinkable shortly 
before. She used the victory in an area marginal to British interests to stir the pride in the 
nation and to declare “the end of British decline”.  
The expedient was successful, in a nation “hungry” for a return, at least in part, to the glory 
of times past (it has to remembered that a large percentage of the population was born in, and 
still remembered, the age of the British Empire11). More generally, the nation was looking for 
something that would restore a long-lost pride in herself. In this respect, the steadiness of her 
response to the IRA’s bomb at Brighton also played an important part. After that episode, she 
definitely acquired the image of a leader able to face any challenge and to revive the fortune of 
the country. This was an image that was very suitable to her political aspirations and personal 
vision. 
Generally speaking, foreign policy in its entirety had a great impact on the support for her 
government, also in electoral terms. In the international arena, the crisis of the communist 
system stood in plain view and it became increasingly difficult to believe that the triumph of 
socialism was ineluctable, as opposed to the widespread opposite belief among Conservative 
leaders in the Fifties and Sixties. The Eighties also saw the triumph of Ronald Reagan and a 
different, more assertive attitude of the Western world against communism. Mrs. Thatcher was 
lucky to be in such an international predicament, which she exploited by establishing a friendly 
relationship with the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. If we add her determination in driving 
the relationship with the European Union, we can thus regard Mrs. Thatcher as the first post-
war British politician who was able to play a prominent role in international politics, and 
therefore to play the card of British pride to her advantage in electoral terms. 
 
 
Political system and Institutions.  
 
Her perseverance and skill in exploiting a series of circumstances (within the party, the country 
and the international arena) played an important role in achieving and maintaining power. 
However, a fundamental aspect in understanding Thatcher’s success is the institutional features 
                                                          
11 From a symbolic point of view the Falklands was much more than a local conflict. It showed to the British people, as well 
as to many Western states, that it was still possible for democracies win a war, after the shocks occasioned by the British 
defeat at Suez and of the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam.  
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of the British political system. They were crucial for success in a program of radical change 
operated by minority positions.  
There are many factors to be considered. The first one is that Thatcher was particularly 
skilful, if not even unscrupulous, in using the power of patronage for political and bureaucratic 
assignments, both within the party and the government. This strategy helped her to overcome, 
in some years, the strong resistance that characterised the first part of her mandate. Another is 
the broad independence that the British system gives to the premier (which as it is known is the 
real power of the executive) in forming and transforming governments. Thatcher also used this 
element almost “unscrupulously”, and in her governments there are a number of moves and 
substitutions never before seen in British history. In this sense, all of her governments (with the 
partial exception of the first) had her unique imprint and were strongly under the Prime 
Minister’s control. 
The electoral system and the two-party system were also important elements in her leadership. Thatcher 
had the fortune of not encountering other charismatic leaders in the Labour Party, and she 
benefited from the divisions within the party (the most important in 1981, which give raise to 
the Social Democratic Party). This was, because the presence of majority rule, an enormous 
electoral advantage. As the traditional anti-conservative vote split, Thatcher could pursue her 
policies without worrying about conquering the centrist electorate. 
An interesting phenomenon is how the territorial diversification of the vote was 
strengthened in the Thatcher’s years.12 Support for the Conservative Party’s increased in the 
traditionally conservative areas (mainly England, the most dynamic economically and therefore 
more “responsive” to the new policies) and decreased in areas traditionally closer to Labour 
(Scotland and Wales). The fact that in the first-past-the-post electoral system (unlike the 
proportional system) it does not matter whether a individual constituency is lost by a greater or 
lesser margin, meant that Thatcher did not have to have to look for mediation or 
accommodation with her adversaries. She could implement her policies focusing on raising 
support in just part of the country, without worrying too much about the other areas.  
By the analysis of this case emerge as a political system with the characteristics of that 
British (majority electoral law, two-party system, strong premiership) could be an advantage and 
an incentive in proposing and emerging of new ideas in order to go out from a crisis situation. 
If a general conclusion can be drawn, it has to be that the case of Thatcher demonstrates, once 
                                                          
12 The data are available on www.parliament.uk.  
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again, how the institutional characteristics and practices of party and political systems always 
play a crucial role in facilitating, or restraining, political change. 
The circumstances and the political skills therefore played a key role. However, ideas also 
played their part, and to cite an opinion of Milton Friedman, perhaps without them there would 
have been Thatcher, but not Thatcherism.13 
 
 
The battle of ideas.  
 
The evolution of the Conservative Party is intertwined with what can be called the “battle of 
ideas”. From a historical and political perspective, the Conservative Party – notwithstanding a 
number of electoral victories – had come the worse out of the post-war period, as it had come 
to accept the welfare consensus of those years, with its attendant high level of public spending 
and generally Keynesian policies. Nevertheless, looking at the history of political ideas, in those 
years there was one of the most flourishing periods of rebirth and re-examination of both liberal and 
conservative theory. In fact, from the last years of the war, authors as Friedrich A. Hayek, Milton 
Friedman and Michael Oakeshott wrote their most important works. These thinkers were not 
to achieve any significant academic success, at least until the Seventies, but their works proved 
to be of consequences and capable of changing the historic events during the years when 
consensus was unsustainable, in economic terms and in terms of social unrest. 
Those ideas were filtered through the Anglo-Saxon culture by columnists14 and were 
constantly debated in think tanks, placing the groundwork for a cultural revival of the 
Conservative Party. When the last conclusive ingredient, Thatcher’s leadership, was added to 
these elements, the result was a great change in the political culture in favour of the free market. 
It has not been demonstrated yet if this change has gone in the right direction and is truly 
sustainable. However, in the UK, as perhaps in no other Western country, ideas seem to have 
had consequences and have determined the course of events. For these reasons, it must be 
analyzed how and with what instruments these ideas were successfully implemented.  
                                                          
13 In reference to the Institute for Economic Affairs’ role Milton Friedman wrote: «Had IEA never existed, Margaret 
Thatcher might still have become Prime Minister, but reforms she presided over would not have been politically feasible, 
and most likely would not even have been part of the platform», in S. ERIKSON (ed.) A Conversation with Harris and Seldon, 
Occasional Paper, IEA 2001, p. 71. 
14 The most important names are: Samuel Brittan (Financial Times), Peter Jay (The Times), T.E. Utley (The Daily Telegraph), 
Ronald Butt (Sunday Times), Paul Johnson (New Statesman), Will Hutton (The Observer) e Hugo Young (The Guardian). They, at 
different times and from different perspectives, gave a significant contribution to the development of liberal ideas. Also very 
important was the role of one of the most popular tabloid newspapers, the Sun.  
9 
 
 
 
Particularly relevant in this process was the role of three think tanks: the Institute for 
Economic Affairs (IEA), the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS) and the Adam Smith Institute 
(ASI). In these institutes there was a remarkable theoretical debate of great political 
consequence, carried out by those who became some of the main advisers or who inspired 
Thatcherite policies during the eighties. These think tanks did, on the conservative side, what in 
the past had made the Fabian Society for Labourism15: they radically changed the political and social 
environment, making it inclined to accept the free market’s challenge and the reduction of the 
state’s tasks. They also developed concrete strategies on how to implement major policy changes. 
The IEA, led by Artur Seldon and Ralph Harris (the latter is also a ghost writer of 
Thatcher’s), is the oldest and the most “theoretical” of the three think tanks. Its aim was to 
spread ideas by the circulation of books and papers16, and fight the battle of ideas to change the 
general political climate. It was working on the ideas of the three major schools of the 
contemporary liberalism: the idea that the state interventionism does not work (Chicago 
School), the fact that there are not alternatives to the market, understood as a process of 
discovery (Austrian School) and the idea that the government fails more often then the market 
(Virginia School). The Institute worked in an excellent way as organizer of meetings and as a 
publisher, inviting some of the most important contemporary authors to speak and publishing 
their works. Joseph was the first conservative politician that approached IEA, using it as 
“source” of books and using those ideas in speeches and articles to propose a radical renewal of 
the Conservative Party and British politics. Thanks to Joseph, Margaret Thatcher approached 
liberal theories, and in the Institute she had some particularly “instructive” meetings with 
Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek.17 
While the IEA goal was to change the cultural climate, the role of the ASI was different and 
more “technical”. It was established in 1977 with the intent to develop strategic policies for 
politicians. Over the years it was particularly useful to Thatcher’s leadership in suggesting ways 
to prevent the lobbies from stopping the process of change. The ASI focused mainly on the 
reform of the public sector, in particular through the lens of the Public Choice Theory. The 
                                                          
15 About the role of think tanks in the Thatcher period see DENHAM, A and GARNETT, M. British think-tanks and the climate of 
opinion, UCL Press, London 1998, KANDIAH, M. D. and SELDON, A. (eds) Ideas and think tanks in contemporary Britain, 
Portland, London 1996 (2 vol.) and COCKETT, R. Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 
1931-1983 Fontana Press, London 1995, who speaks about “counter-revolution against Fabianism”, p.6. 
16 Some of the most relevant essays are in R. HARRIS e A. SELDON, (eds.) The Emerging Consensus...? Institute of Economics 
Affairs, 1981. 
17 Ralph Harris and Arthur Seldon tell how Thatcher met Friedman, who in a “long dinner” (after a private seminar) in 
1978, explained her a lot of details about monetarism. They also recount how Thatcher, already prime minister and already 
Iron Lady, met Hayek in IEA and attended his lesson “like a meek schoolgirl”. See S. ERIKSON (ed.) A Conversation with Harris 
and Seldon, cit., pp. 51-53.  
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theory – in extreme synthesis – claims that the public sector is ruled not by consumers, as 
instead by service providers (which often translate into the bureaucrats themselves), that 
obviously have the interest to increase their role even when not needed. The strategy for 
reforming this area was named Micropolitics18, and was based on the idea that in order to achieve 
reform, instead of tackling head-interest groups in the public sector, it is better to propose 
some attractive alternatives for change. It is a strategy to “circumvent” interest groups and their 
ability to prevent overall reforms of the system. 
The most interesting case is the Centre for Policy Studies.19 It was founded by Joseph and 
Thatcher, with a clear political task. Its goal was to develop new policies, and also to “convert” 
politicians and intellectuals to the Thatcherian cause. The CPS was mainly concerned in 
acquiring research on public policies to adopt once in the government. Nevertheless, especially 
in the opposition years, it produced many documents, often written by politicians, of 
remarkable theoretical level. These documents focused not only on economics, but also on 
what the values and objectives of the Conservative Party should be.20 
Over the years, the CPS became part of Thatcherian leadership and was an instrument used 
in opposition to the Conservative Central Office and the Conservative Research Department. 
These were sort of internal think tanks in the party, still close to the old leadership and hostile 
to Thatcher. Hence, her desire to have a place for development of new ideas, a think tank to 
attract and form people capable of making theoretical contributions and with the ability to put 
them into practice. A sort of “gym” for the new leadership, something necessary for an 
ambitious program of change. Therefore, the history of the CPS shows on one hand the 
difficulties that Thatcher met within her party, and on the other hand her ability to create a new 
political leadership. With those people, despite difficulties resulting from her character, she was 
able to change the country over the following years.  
But analysis of the CPS is also essential in order to understand what the strategy for 
government and for change in British politics was, and how it was drafted. This change was 
difficult to effect because of the fight against the Trade Unions.  
                                                          
18 See Madsen PIRIE Micropolitics. The Creation of Successful Policy, Wildwood House, Aldershot 1988 
19 The story of the early CPS years is told in the book written by the individual that was for many years in charge of the 
Centre: A. SHERMAN, Paradox of Power, cit. Some of the most important CPS publications are in HAAS, Richard & KNOX, 
Oliver Policies of Thatcherism: thoughts from a London thinktank London-New York, University Press of America, London 1991, 
but them are all available in www.cps.org.uk/.  
20 Two papers are particularly significant that Keith Joseph wrote in 1976: Stranded on the Middle Ground and Monetarism is not 
Enough. In the first he attacked the Middle Ground and defend the “moral and material benefits of the market order” In the 
second he claimed that monetarism is useful but “is not enough unless there is also the essential reduction of the state sector 
and the essential encouragement of enterprise. We are over-governed, over-spent, over-taxed”. 
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Strategy and rhetoric. 
 
Joseph and Thatcher knew that the political and intellectual climate was changing in favour of 
the free market. However, they also account that the battle of ideas had to be won “in the right 
way”. In this respect, the memory of the U-Turn in the Heath government was crucial. Heath 
had failed because he had advanced a liberal platform without the necessary theoretical 
underpinning, and because he did not have the right strategy to cope with the vested interests 
in the welfare state. He had attempted to make his reforms more consensual through a dialogue 
with the Trade Unions, but this dialogue turned out to be impossible and his project was utterly 
defeated. By witnessing Heath’s failure, Thatcher and her staff concluded that to change the 
country they needed to face off the power of the Trade Unions, and that new ideas were 
important to win the battle in the “right way”, they needed to spread new ideas about the 
government, but also to devise a set of suitable policies. 
The “Trade Unions’ issue” was analysed in a number of research papers and documents, 
one of which in particular relief provided the name for the emerging Thatcherite strategy. The 
Stepping Stones Program21 was written in the autumn of 1977 by John Hoskyns and Norman 
Strauss, who, together with Alfred Sherman (Director of CPS) and subsequently, Alan Walters, 
provided a critical contribution to the task of translating ideas into policies. The document 
contended that an electoral victory only based on the public’s dissatisfaction with the Labour 
Government was going to be fruitless, and it identified the Trade Unions as “the only group 
whose leaders’ political convictions and lack of economic understanding could pit them against 
any government which dares to do what has to be done” (p. 2). 
The real problem was how to challenge the Trade Unions’ power. If the Conservative Party 
had openly challenged them, in all likelihood they would have lost the election, but if it had 
acquiesced in order to appease them, this would have stifled any hope of reform. The system 
seemed in fact to be “un-reformable” by means of a process of dialogue with the party’s 
opponents, therefore a clash with the Trade Unions, however precarious the outcome, was 
unavoidable. Hence the development of a strategy, christened “stepping stones”, which aimed 
                                                          
21 The Stepping Stones Programme, www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/displaydocument.asp?docid=109848.  
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to change the “climate of opinion” in the country and to ensure widespread support for the 
new politics of Thatcher. 
It was a strategy of gradually wearing down the Trade Unions’ power. An open clash was 
avoided in the beginning, but the Conservatives never stopped blaming the Trade Unions and 
the Labour Party for the decline of Great Britain. A communication policy was carefully crafted 
in order to convey the impression that the Conservative Party would be a better manager of the 
state’s budget, without disavowing the intention of preparing a great political change. This 
strategy was aimed at the general public, for electoral purposes, and at the party itself, where the 
opposition to the new leadership was still very strong.22 
This was a long-term strategy which lasted throughout the years in power. Along with the 
key contributions of the CPS and ASI, it was to be augmented by the development of specific 
policies aimed at the areas which needed to be modernized and to be transferred over to private 
management. The factor that mainly contributed to the success of this strategy and to the 
electoral victory of the Conservative Party, however, was the collapse of the welfare consensus. 
The “winter of discontent” saw inflation levels, which have not been equalled since, and a 
number of strikes which often turned violent affairs, unusual even for a country long 
accustomed to these phenomena. 
Thanks to this series of circumstances, Margaret Thatcher was able to have her political 
proposals accepted by her own party and then by the country. The circumstances in fact 
supported the notion, advanced since 1974 by Keith Joseph and Thatcher herself, namely that 
however unappealing, a radical change was the only way out from the British predicament. The 
so-called TINA (there is no alternative) was the great rhetorical device that let the new ideas 
prevail first in the party and then in the country. The political proposal of Mrs. Thatcher was 
supported by a minority in the Party and in the country, but in time came to be accepted as a 
bitter medicine that couldn’t be refused.  
However, to understand what such a medicine was composed of and how it could work 
effectively, a last and crucial ingredient of the prescription needs to be addressed, which will 
serve as a reminder of how much individuals matter in historical processes. I refer, of course, to 
Margaret Thatcher herself. The first feature of Thatcherism is actually tied to the strong 
                                                          
22 This strategy was well embodied in two documents presented during Party’s Congress: The right approach, in 1976, and The 
right approach to the economy, in 1977. While the former is decidedly “ideological” and radical, the second (to whose writing had 
also participate James Prior, linked to the old leadership of Heath) was written in a more conciliatory style, in the attempt 
not to frighten a party unaccustomed to the forthcoming economic policies. For a discussion of the parts of the second 
document that were considered wrong and impracticable, see the notes made by Thatcher in her copy of the document, 
www.margaretthatcher.org/document/3FE 9928C24064D23804B47E4879E2CF0 .pdf.  
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personality of Thatcher, a politician with a deeply-held faith in the notion that a change was needed 
for the United Kingdom, and who refused to meet halfway those people ready to compromise 
in that regard. This does not mean that she was not ready to give up some goals or to 
implement a strategy of gradual change when appropriate. What it does mean is that her 
political style and her manner of decision-making never saw compromise as worthy in itself, but 
was characterised by a Manichean attitude in which the “evil side” was represented by the “drift 
to Socialism”. 
The rhetoric or Margaret Thatcher, in fact, was not characterized by an apologia of the free 
market, but a sort of demonization of “enemies” who had brought the British nation to ruin, namely 
the Trade Unions and those of the socialist mindset. She had a Manichean vision of politics, where 
the evil was represented by the socialist mindset and this gave her a “messianic” image, a 
veritable prophet of national redemption.23 If it is true, as has been asserted24, that the main 
attribute of a leader is to be able to tell a story about the past, Thatcher was a true master in this 
art. She did it by identifying in the Labour Party, which she called socialist, and in the Trade 
Unions as the culprits of the British national decline. 
Thatcher’s leadership thus found its essence (and this fits well with what we know of her 
personality) in the contrast with an enemy, either “external”, the Labour Party and international 
Communism, or “internal”, the supporters of Tory paternalism and welfare consensus in her 
own party. It is not easy to understand what in her description of Britain’s “enemies” was true 
and what was imaginary25, but it is hard to deny that the consensus and a mindset inclined 
towards the welfare state, if not to socialism itself, was something real and well-rooted in pre-
Thatcher Britain. The change in public opinion was certainly influenced by the national and 
international circumstances of the time. At the same time, the outcome of the process would 
have been different, and less firmly rooted, if the leader of the country had not been a woman 
as determined in her decision making and as ready to distinguish, without unnecessary subtlety, 
good from evil as Margaret Thatcher. This particular aspect has led some scholars to consider 
Thatcherism a personal and instinctive approach to politics rather than a coherent set of ideas.  
                                                          
23 On this see Kennet Minogue in K. MINOGUE, e M. BIDDISS, M. (eds.) Thatcherism: Personality and Politics, New York, St. 
Martin’s Press, 1987, p. 4 e ss.  
24 H. GARDNER, Leading Minds: An Anatomy Of Leadership, Basic Book, New York 1995. 
25 See for example Peter JENKINS, Mrs. Thatcher's Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era, Harvard University Press, 1987, 
«The consensus she imagined herself to be smashing was founded more in myth then in reality» p. 3.  
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Nevertheless, the question of whether Thatcherism can be considered an ideology or a 
practical response dictated by personal belief and experience remains open and merits further 
examination.  
 
 
 
Moral Values. Thatcherism as an ideology?  
 
The first question is whether Thatcher’s only aimed to revive the British economy or if the 
economic measures were merely a way to achieve other goals. Were other values to be 
implemented or “restored” by her ostensibly economic strategy? As we have seen, the 
cornerstone of her strategy was to denounce the link between Socialist ideology, Labour Party 
and Trade Unions leadership. Mrs. Thatcher held these parties responsible for the “British 
disease”, highlighting the failure of the consensus and then proposing an alternative model. At 
its core, however, the criticism was not economic in character, and the free market, however 
vigorously proposed, was not seen as the solution for every problem. 
Her belief was that the economy was weak because something had gone wrong spiritually and 
philosophically26. The only way to overcome the English predicament was to therefore restore a 
set of moral values that had characterized the past of Great Britain, and which appeared to 
have been lost. The restoration of moral values seemed to be a prerequisite for economic 
revival, among a more general restoration of England’s spirit, and the economic problems 
could only be solved in terms of moral values. She referred to what she called Victorian values, 
and stated that she had “absorbed” them in her childhood thanks to the example of her father 
and her “Victorian grandmother”. An exact definition of the “true” Victorian values is not easy, 
but it is possible to try and understand what Thatcher meant by Victorian values and how she thought they 
might be restored.  
                                                          
26 For instance, speaking about the winter of discontent, she said: «You can't go on letting a country decline economically 
without finding something else: that it declines spiritually and morally as well. If you no longer have confidence in your 
country to solve its economic problems, very soon you begin to lose confidence in the spirit of your country and you find all 
kinds of other things happening as well. I believe that's what happened this last winter. None of us ever expected to see 
some of the strikes we saw. We said those things can't happen in Britain, but I believe it was because some of our economic 
failures had so demoralised us that we got a decline of a sort we never expected to see here», Speech to Conservatives in 
Gravesend, 1979 April 17. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=104016 
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First of all, we can say that those values which Thatcher called Victorian could be better 
described as Victorian virtues, or perhaps even bourgeois virtues27. On one hand, there was an 
“ideal reference to the values of her childhood in Grantham: family, hard work, thrift, sense of 
community, etc. On the other hand, these values were inherent in individual virtues: energetic 
and active individuals, proud to make their own way without asking the state for help. The only 
request the holders of these virtues asked of the state was a framework of rules that allowed 
them to work in safety and order, and in particular, the defence of private property rights. 
This is also the typical vision of the liberal tradition, which sees in the law the only common 
good that the society needs. Thatcher saw her position as a genuinely conservative one, in that she 
wished to restore what she saw as the ancient British liberties, protected by the Rule of Law, 
discarded by the socialist ambition to govern according to discretionary rules, aiming to 
organize and shape society.28 
Thatcher believed in the existence of Victorian values. She was firmly convinced that these 
value were extant in a historical period, the Victorian age, and that they were the cornerstone of 
Britain’s greatness. Britain had declined in the twentieth century exactly because those values 
were increasingly neglected. All this was underpinned by the negative myth of Thatcherism, 
namely the socialist mentality and the related idea of a “nanny state”, a state that doesn’t see its 
citizens as free and responsible individuals, but creatures in need of help and protection. The 
result of the consensus’ years (of which conservative politicians equally bore responsibility) was 
the destruction of those virtues, and a decrease of the individual’s capacity to be independent of the 
state. 
Starting from this interpretation of British history, Thatcher’s problem was how to 
reintroduce those Victorian values that had been swept away by at least thirty-five years of what 
she called socialism. How could this historical process be reversed? Certainly the values could 
not be inculcated by government’s enforcement, but the government could place the 
responsible for the decay of those virtues on the socialist mentality. It could completely change 
the framework, in order to induce individuals to consider themselves responsible for their own 
destiny and behave accordingly. That meant there could no longer be the nanny state, but there 
                                                          
27 See Gertrude HIMMELFARB, The De-moralization of Society. From Victorian Virtues to Modern Values, Vintage Book, New York 
1996.  
28 The distinction – of which Thatcher was perfectly aware – between a “nomocratic” political system which simply lays 
down "rules of conduct", and “teleocratic”, which draws up rules to achieve what is considered to be the happiness of 
individuals, is in the works of Michael Oakeshott and, although with a different terminology, in Hayek. 
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must be a liberal state which set the framework for individuals who would be free to act and try 
to achieve their own prosperity. 
From the classical liberal perspective, there is at least another important notion which 
Thatcher embraced: namely the classical liberal belief that economic liberty and political liberty 
are inextricable, and that the one cannot be conceived without the other. The argument that the 
creation of wealth can be kept separate from its distribution was long extant in Britain, not least 
in its liberal tradition, as it was advanced by John Stuart Mill. This notion – whose most 
renowned supporter in recent times was John Rawls – was strongly disputed in the post-war 
years, most notably by Friedrich Hayek and by the Austrian School. And, revealingly, Thatcher 
explicitly draws form Hayek when points to economic liberty as an indispensable stepping stone to restoring 
liberty tout court. 
Thatcher’s vision was characterized by a “moral argument” for “competitive capitalism” 
and its institutions. Her goal was more ambitious and enduring than a mere economic revival. 
Indeed the economic revival, made by free and responsible individuals, became a key to restore 
the old lost virtues. This objective was demonstrated through the economic activity of her 
governments, need to be understood in the light of this overarching goal. This is particularly 
true of the privatization which occurred during the second term. This has been properly named 
“popular capitalism”, the widespread presence of capitalism in society, that, by making 
individuals owners, brings them to be autonomous individuals, and the makers of their – and 
the nation’s – well-being. 
The privatization and popular capitalism are the heart of the Thatcherism, and Margaret 
Thatcher showed how their significance reaches beyond economic aspects and represents a real 
vision of democracy. 
 
Our opponents would have us believe that all problems can be solved by State intervention. But 
Governments should not run business. Indeed, the weakness of the case for State ownership has become 
all too apparent. For state planners do not have to suffer the consequences of their mistakes. It's the 
taxpayers who have to pick up the bill. This Government has rolled back the frontiers of the State, and 
will roll them back still further.  
[...] We Conservatives believe in popular capitalism – believe in a property-owning democracy. [...] The 
great political reform of the last century was to enable more and more people to have a vote. Now the 
great Tory reform of this century is to enable more and more people to own property. Popular capitalism 
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is nothing less than a crusade to enfranchise the many in the economic life of the nation. We 
Conservatives are returning power to the people. That is the way to one nation, one people.29 
 
As showed by Shirley Letwin30, privatization was a way to oppose the effects of socialism 
and to invest individuals with a sense of values, because choice in a free society always implies 
responsibility31. In this sense the privatization process and in particular the sale of the enterprises 
to many shareholders, the number increasing from 3 to 11 million, can be interpreted as 
Thatcher’s underlining the “moral dimension” of this phenomenon. 
A decisive step, mirroring the previous one, was the privatization of the public houses, which 
extraordinarily increased the number of owners. That sale was not the best investment for the 
state’s budget, the houses were sold at a price lower than market price, but the goal, once again, 
was not purely economic. As for privatization, the aim was to implement the beneficial effects 
of private property, which makes people more independent, more willing to take risks and 
ultimately, self-sufficient. Through property ownership, it is possible to develop the 
entrepreneurial spirit and change values. This also leads to the consequent desire to pass 
ownership to descendants. Thatcher also hoped to promote the family, creating more 
responsible parents and reducing the divorce rate.  
Other elements of Thatcherism, according with Letwin, can be viewed as “moral” 
objectives, more than mere economic objectives. The most interesting example is the fight 
against the Trade Unions, which previously enjoyed a high level of immunity acquired more or less 
“accidentally” and for individual reasons that historically made sense. Over the years, however, 
these immunities had turned into real forms of coercion suffered by individuals. For example, 
union membership had become mandatory, or closed shop, for everyone who wanted a job. 
Thatcher considered this a real violation of individual rights. In this sense, her anti-unionism 
                                                          
29 Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 1986 Oct 10, www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp? 
docid=106498. In the same year Nigel Lawson, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer between June 1983 and October 
1989, used the same expression: «Just as we have made Britain a nation of home owners so it is the long-term ambition of 
this Government to make the British people a nation of share owners, too; to create a popular capitalism in which more and 
more men and women have a direct personal stake in British business and industry. Through the rapid growth of employee 
share schemes, and through the outstandingly successful privatisation programme, much progress has been made – but not 
enough. Nor, I fear, will we ever achieve our goal as long as the tax system continues to discriminate so heavily in favour of 
institutional investment rather than direct share ownership». http://www.margaretthatcher. org/archive/ displaydocument. 
asp?docid=109503.  
30 S. LETWIN, The Anatomy of Thatcherism, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers 1993. 
31 In her memoirs she wrote: «Privatization [...] was one of the central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting effect 
of socialism. Ownership by the state is just that – ownership by an impersonal legal entity: it amounts to control the 
politicians and civil servants [...]. but through privatization – particularly the kind of privatization which leads to the widest 
possible share ownership by members of the public – the state’s power is reduced and the power of the people enhanced. 
[...] Privatization is at the centre of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom»The Downing Street Years, 
HarperCollin, London 1993 p. 676.  
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was above all a fight to restore individual freedom of contract and the voluntary nature of 
joining an organization.  
Looking at this set of ideas, and the myths and symbols characterizing her political 
experience, it is easy to understand the temptation of some scholars, as well as some anti-
Thatcherian members of the Conservative Party32, to consider Thatcherism as an ideology. 
Nevertheless, if her basic ideas and most of her political acts were really coherent, it is difficult to 
define Thatcherism as a political theory and it would be wrong study Margaret Thatcher as a political 
thinker. 33 
Margaret Thatcher was a politician with the desire and ability, for a variety of circumstances, 
to govern with a “mission” underscored by a set of values. In politics it is possible to be 
coherent without a “theory”, following instincts, a feature of politicians but not of 
philosophers. She certainly acted in accordance with values, especially freedom, which caused 
her to be accused of being “ideological” by some conservatives. However, her political actions 
were always coherent with the “classic” conservatism: pragmatic, not ideological. She was 
always seeking a practical response to a particular historical situation, and the motives became clear to 
her only after a while. In that sense Letwin is right when she says that the privatization program 
produced moral, more than material, effects. But we must also recognize that it probably was 
not implemented with that aim, or at least initially was not dictated by those motives. 
Undoubtedly, she read books and was influenced by theories, but these just gave 
“intellectual respectability” to her deep convictions, which took precedent over those readings 
and were rooted in her experience and character34. She showed interest in theoretical 
discussions, but mainly showed an extraordinary ability to draw practical implications from those 
discussions, and then use the ideas as political tools. She was not an intellectual, which often for 
a politician is not a disadvantage, even in democratic countries, but she had an extraordinary 
ability to use ideas as political weapons. Her leadership supplied a very remarkable stimulus to 
the intellectual debate. All these characteristics made her an ideal strong politician, which in 
history is not frequent, but it is not an anomaly. 
                                                          
32 In particular I. GILMOUR, Dancing with Dogma. Britain under Thathcerism, Simon &Schuster, London 1992.  
33 Margaret Thatcher showed the same idea in 2000, when, looking at ideologies as “liberalism”, “capitalism” or “statism” 
said «I would like to be clear: I don't regard Thatcherism as an "-ism" in any of these senses. And if I ever invented an 
ideology, that certainly wasn't my intention». www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108387  
34 Concluding her second book of memoirs she wrote that her ideas about economy came from her “personal experience” 
of her world: “my ‘Bloomsbury’ was Grantham”, The Path to Power, HarperCollins, London 1995, chapter 16..  
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Her main characteristic, namely the determination to govern and attempt to achieve what 
she saw as right, marks her magnitude. It is also the source of a series of paradoxes that have 
characterized her leadership and makes Thatcherism extremely interesting and original. 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy, liberalism and conservatism. The paradoxes of Thatcherism 
  
In their assessment of the results achieved by the Thatcher’s government, scholars do not seem 
to have reached an agreement.35 There are many doubts about the capacity of Thatcherism to 
revitalize “moral values”, especially those pertaining to solidarity and sense of community, and 
whether or not it has led to a materialism that doesn’t fit into this kind of values. This question 
raises, once again, one of the classic problems of political philosophy, well identified by 
Nietzsche, about the possibility of establishing moral values on something other than religion36. 
It is widely accepted that what was implemented by Thatcher has been one of the most 
imposing and enduring changes of the political culture of a country. Although controversial, her 
attempt to solve the social conflicts produced by the welfare consensus, and therefore from 
excessive state intervention in economy, by means of a greater reliance on market seems 
mechanisms seems to have been a successful and long-lasting one. If her goal was to replace 
the interventionist policy based on consensus, or at least on negotiations, with the “order of the 
market”, we must admit that she reached her goals. The spread of the free market culture and 
opening markets to international competition accompanied by a different attitude about the 
role of the state, restored the UK as one of the most competitive economies in the world. 
There are many elements to examine in order to evaluate how profound this change was, 
primarily at the cultural level, and perhaps the most obvious is the acceptance by the Labour 
Party of some Thatcherism bench marks. 37 
However, beyond the fact that the change which affected of one of the most ancient and 
solid democracies in the world still seems to have lasted, there are a number of “unresolved 
                                                          
35 Interesting data can be found in J. E. EVANS, Thatcher and Thatcherism, London and Routledge, New York 1997 
36 See again HIMMELFARB, The De-moralization of Society, cit, in particular pp. 3-18 and 259-263. 
37 See Simon JENKINS, Thatcher and sons : a revolution in three acts, Penguin, London 2006. 
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issues” regarding the relationship between Thatcherism as a historical experience and its 
relationship with democracy, liberalism and conservatism. That is why Thatcherism stands as 
an ideal “litmus test” not only for some problems related to institutional change, but also for an 
analysis of contemporary political theory 
As previously mentioned, Thatcher's intention was not only to ensure the Conservative 
Party governed the country, but that it governed with a precise mission, or “doing the right 
thing”. In her vision, this meant serving the “common good” as opposed to special interests 
represented by pressure groups, primarily Trade Unions. Thatcher’s idea was that the government 
should act in the interest of the entire nation, therefore the situation which dominated during the 
consensus’ years was unacceptable, because the government, rather than pursuing the common 
good, acted only as a mediator between social actors. To Thatcher, the Trade Unions influence 
over the government seemed a clear distortion of politics. 
In fact, the Trade Unions became the true decision makers in a system which bore a strong 
resemblance to a corporatist one. The government increased its duties too much, by 
nationalizing companies and increasing wages, and thus became less a representative of the 
national interest, and more and more an actor among others, forced into the role of mediator 
between conflicting interests. Over time, maintaining this role became impossible. It was 
therefore clear that in order to have a government authoritative and representative of the whole 
nation, it was necessary to strip the Trade Unions of their bargaining power, and eliminate what 
Thatcher described as the socialist mentality. 
Her idea that the state had lost its authoritativeness and its capacity to act in the common 
good, identified a classic problem of democracies, which often risk being hostage of interest 
groups and electoral lobbies that the political powers seek to satisfy with the distribution of 
public resources. The consequent increase of taxation and interventionism, raises problems in a 
democracy overloaded with an excess of demands, unable to fulfil the expectations it has 
deliberately raised. 
Margaret Thatcher proposed a typical conservative-liberal formula in order to overcome this 
situation. Reverse the process by reducing the tasks of the state, its “sphere of intrusiveness”, 
and revive the economy, enabling it to recover its loss of authority. Conservatism and 
liberalism, as political theories, have deep differences, but they can converge when the historical 
situation demonstrates to a conservative that a state with too many tasks can not be 
authoritative, and to a liberal that the absence of certain conservative values leads many people 
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to see the state as a possible solution to all problems and all expectations, more or less 
legitimate. 
Nevertheless, the way the British democracy has changed, does not answer the interesting 
questions. Thatcher, as previously mentioned, didn’t have a clear ideology but rather a very 
clear idea of what was the right thing to do for the country, and which “enemies” – both in the 
Labour and the Conservative parties – opposed her project. This deeply held belief led her to 
trust only herself, and caused her to fear not only her opponents, but her political allies as well. 
In fact, even the relationship with people appointed by her, “thatcherians”, was never a 
relationship of complete trust, perhaps with the exception of Keith Joseph. This is 
demonstrated by the remarkable number of “thatcherians” that she fired.38  
The tendency to distrust everybody and to continuously insert herself into every 
government decision, was a consequence of her political experience. As previously mentioned, 
she held a minority position inside the party for a long time, and was opposed by the 
establishment. It was also a consequence of her character, which was an essential ingredient in 
implementing her political program. This tendency led Thatcher to always seek a privileged 
relationship with the “British people”, because she felt she was uniquely able to understand “the 
people”, their will, and at a minimum, their real needs. This is a feature revealed by an analysis 
of her speeches, but also demonstrated through her attitude “against” the press, who she 
accused several times, for example after the Falklands war, of being unpatriotic and lacking 
common sense. 
The most interesting element was her deeply held conviction that her reforms returned 
“power” to the people, power expropriated over the years by the welfare consensus. This 
“expropriation” had occurred as a result of the growth of the “nanny state”, which involved 
itself in decisions which should be left to the private sphere, and therefore deprived individuals 
of their responsibility and freedom. In this sense, even her attack on what she called the 
“socialistic mentality”, can interpreted through her famous sentence, borrowed from the liberal 
tradition, that “the society does not exist”, because only individuals exist. 39 
                                                          
38 For an interesting account: John RANELAGH, Thatcher's People, HarperCollins, London 1991.  
39 This is the main idea of “methodological individualism”, which is an important element of the Classical Liberalism. It is 
clearly explained by scholars such Ludwig von Mises and Karl Popper. Thatcher remembers in her memoirs how her 
sentence, there being “no such thing as society” was often misunderstand because the second part of the sentence was not 
quoted: «there are individuals men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except trough 
people, and people must look to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then to look after our 
neighbours», The Downing Street Years, p. 626.  
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The return of power and freedom to the people was executed on several levels. On one 
hand, the privatizations resulted in a “nation of owners”, of houses and firms’ shares, which 
meant individuals became responsible for their own destiny. On the other hand, there was the 
fight against the corporatist redoubts, primarily the Trade Unions and Local Councils, 
frequently run by the Labour Party, which had increased their power over individuals by 
“taking care of them”, and this resulted in a change and an increase of the state’s tasks. This last 
point was the attack against a corporatist vision, which had deprived the parliament of its 
authority, leading to the bankruptcy of the representative system.  
These may seem, once again, “classical” problems of contemporary democracies, and the 
solution may seem the solution of classical liberalism. However, if they are considered in the 
context of our remarks on some of Thatcher government’s features, a paradox does emerge. It 
is the attempt to solve the crisis of representation through a leadership that seeks to sweep out 
the “intermediate bodies”, more or less degenerated, and return the authority to the state, 
making it the only true interpreter of the popular will. If the goal was not a reduction of the 
scope of the state, this might look like a case of Jacobin democracy and populism. The 
government, or rather the leader, stands as the only interpreter of popular will and the only one 
able to return the power to the people, who have been otherwise deprived by the “enemies”. 
However, looking at the conservative and classical liberal theories, Thatcherism faces yet 
another paradox. The government was extremely active in changing the existing state of things, 
and seemed nearly “revolutionary”. In a way, her government was very intrusive, so that the 
path towards economic change and relationships between different social actors almost always 
took the form of a “inverse planning”: it was necessary to “force” the market to work, through 
the intervention of politics. The intervention was designed to reinvigorate the market and 
entrepreneurship, but it took the form of a continuous, cumbersome and “planned” state 
intervention. In this regard, Thatcherism does not benefit the conservative vision, which avoids 
large and sudden changes or revolutions. It also doesn’t benefit classical liberalism, which wants 
the role of the state limited and as minimally invasive as possible. 
This contradiction may be relevant in terms of political theory, but it was not relevant for 
Thatcher, who was a politician and not a philosopher. Her idea was act to restore the ancient 
freedoms and the old British virtues,40 and in this sense she declared herself a conservative, an 
                                                          
40 In 1999 she said: «Commentators sometimes talk as if the policies that turned Britain from the sick man of Europe to the 
model for Europe - indeed for more than Europe - were based on an economic formula. And I willingly grant the influence 
of free market economists, like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. But the root of the approach we pursued in the 
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allegiance which had experienced a sharp decline in previous decades. This goal meant 
returning to the Rule of Law, establishing a state which does not intervene in the economy, and 
finally, returning to the “Victorian” values. In order to achieve these objectives a strong 
government action is needed, because it is not important how much the government does, as 
instead the direction in which it operates. The goal is to reduce the role of the state, and it is 
not a paradox that to make such a reduction there should be an almost “autocratic 
government”. 
Additionally, if the theoretical and political visions can clearly be kept separate there is a 
common problem for both. Is it possible that the implementation of liberal and conservative 
ideas are made by a government that uses methods that are neither liberal nor conservative? Is it 
possible to “restore” freedom and conservative values by government intervention in some way “despotic” and 
“revolutionary”? The problem becomes even more acute when it is considered that the changes 
implemented by Thatcher were to be, primarily cultural even before economic. Her 
government wanted to roll back a process which began long before the years of consensus, and 
in cultural terms, maybe a century before the advent of Thatcher41. Is it enough to have a 
charismatic leader in order to produce profound and enduring change in the political culture? 
It is difficult to provide a positive answer to these questions if we reduce Thatcherism to 
only Margaret Thatcher’s figure and work. Once again, we must remember that she was an 
ingredient, essential and unique but not sufficient, in a long battle of ideas that had begun before she even 
reached power. She was, in some respects, the ripe fruit of that battle. The liberal theories gave 
not only “respectability” to her deeply held beliefs, but the liberal ideas, and those who worked 
on them, gave her awareness, strength, arguments and techniques to execute her principles and 
objectives.  
This is why Thatcherism, who found in Margaret Thatcher an indispensable but not 
sufficient element, is an extraordinary lesson in how the ideas “are the key point” in historical 
processes, but they always rely on individuals and circumstances in order to have consequences. 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
1980s lay deep in human nature, and more especially the nature of the British people. If you really believe, as a matter of 
passionate conviction, in the talents and character of your nation, of course you want to set it free. And we British have a 
true vocation for liberty - all our history proves it».  
www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108381 
41 One of the most interesting attempts to show how a new mentality, suitable with socialism, existed in Great Britain till the 
end of Nineteenth century, is S. LETWIN, The Pursuit of Certainty, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1998 (1965), especially part iv.  
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